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LAUNCH AND COMMISSIONING OF THE LUNAR 
RECONNAISSANCE ORBITER (LRO) 
Neerav Shah,* Philip Calhoun*, Joseph Garrick,* Oscar Hsu,* and James 
Simpson† 
The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) launched on June 18, 2009 from the 
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station.  LRO, designed, built, and operated by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Space Flight 
Center in Greenbelt, MD, is gathering crucial data on the lunar environment that 
will help astronauts prepare for long-duration lunar expeditions.  To date, the 
Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) subsystem has operated nominally 
and met all requirements.  However, during the early phase of the mission, the 
GN&C Team encountered some anomalies.  For example, during the Solar Ar-
ray and High Gain Antenna deployments, one of the safing action points tripped, 
which was not expected.  Also, the spacecraft transitioned to its safe hold mode, 
SunSafe, due to encountering an end of file for an ephemeris table.  During the 
five-day lunar acquisition, one of the star trackers triggered the spacecraft to 
transition into a safe hold configuration, the cause of which was determined.  
These events offered invaluable insight to better understand the performance of 
the system they designed.  An overview of the GN&C subsystem will be fol-
lowed by a mission timeline.  Then, interesting flight performance as well as 
anomalies encountered by the GN&C Team will be discussed in chronological 
order.   
INTRODUCTION 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter 
(LRO) launched on June 18, 2009 from the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station aboard an Atlas V 
launch vehicle and into a direct insertion trajectory to the Moon; Figure 1 is a drawing of LRO.  
LRO, designed, built, and operated by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) in 
Greenbelt, MD, is gathering crucial data on the lunar environment that will help astronauts pre-
pare for long-duration lunar expeditions.  The mission, with a nominal one-year duration, utilizes 
a complement of seven scientific instruments to find safe landing sites, locate potential resources, 
characterize the radiation environment, and test new technologies1.  From launch and early cruise 
operations through commissioning and into its one year mission, LRO has performed very well, 
with all subsystems operating well within the bounds of their respective design requirements, and 
has been collecting excellent science data.  An early mission highlight was the release of images 
taken by the LRO Camera Narrow Angle Camera (LROC NAC) of the Apollo landing sites, ap-
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pearing on cable news networks
ble footprints left by Apollo astronauts
Figure 1.  LRO mechanical drawing, with spacecraft body coordinate system (BCS) identified  
This paper begins with an overvi
mission timeline.  An early mission chronological narrative follows, describing GN&C subsystem 
performance and interesting GN&C events (including some unexpected safe mode entries) that 
occurred over a period from separation to
missioning phase. 
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Primary Attitude Control Mode - Observing Mode 
Observing mode is LRO’s primary attitude control mode, which provides full-sky 3-axis 
spacecraft attitude slewing and fine pointing for lunar nadir and off-nadir as well as inertial tar-
gets3.  This control mode is used for all nominal pointing and slewing operations including those 
for science data taking, instrument calibration, as well as initial attitude acquisition during Delta-
V mode operation.  The hardware complement used for this mode includes four reaction wheels 
(RW), two star trackers (ST), and one 3-axis inertial reference unit (IRU).  Two quaternion output 
STs are operated continuously, providing a highly accurate attitude reference to ensure attitude 
performance during occasional single star tracker occultation.  Attitude and rate sensor data is 
processed onboard using a six-state Kalman filter4, which estimates IRU bias and spacecraft iner-
tial attitude quaternions.  The filtered quaternion data is used as the attitude source for onboard 
attitude control as well as the definitive spacecraft attitude for ground processing of science data.  
Control torque commands are generated using a standard PID type control law.  This algorithm 
utilizes quaternion feedback proportionally-limited attitude error to ensure that all slews closely 
track the eigenaxis with a constant slew rate.  An attitude limit is set to ensure ample torque mar-
gin at a slew rate of 0.1 deg/sec over the design system momentum range of 80 Nms. 
Thruster Maneuver Mode – Delta-V and Delta-H 
Cruise trajectory, mid course correction, lunar orbit insertion, and orbit maintenance maneuv-
ers are accomplished using a GSFC in-house developed propulsion system to adjust the space-
craft’s velocity magnitude and vector direction.  The system utilizes four 20-lbf thrusters (inser-
tion thrusters or NT) and eight 5-lbf thrusters (attitude thrusters or AT) for orbit adjustments and 
attitude control during maneuvers.  The NTs are reserved for providing orbit adjust for the lunar 
orbit insertion maneuvers following a trans-lunar cruise phase.  The ATs are used for attitude 
control and/or orbit adjustment during all phases of the mission.  Delta-V mode uses a PID con-
troller to generate thruster torque commands for attitude control during orbit adjust operations.  
This mode uses an IRU propagated attitude for feedback control since the higher body rates and 
accelerations during propulsion may be too large to maintain reliable star tracker operation.  
Spacecraft angular velocity measurements from the IRU are also used for rate feedback in the 
Delta-V controller.   Performance for this mode varies with the operational events during the mis-
sion lifetime.  The performance requirement is averaged over the burn period because there are 
initial transient periods of high rate and attitude errors that settle out over time.  To improve the 
transient response and settled attitude errors, a feed-forward torque, estimated based on thruster 
configuration and spacecraft mass properties, was added. 
The ACS also provides for a thruster based system momentum management algorithm (known 
as Delta-H) to maintain the system and wheel momentum to within acceptable levels.  Delta-H 
employs a similar algorithm as Delta-V, with the two differences being the method for computing 
the reaction wheel commanded torque and the removal of the integral term.  Each reaction wheel 
is actively commanded in the controller to a commanded momentum level.  A system momentum 
level command is also used to determine when the targeted momentum level has been reached, to 
within some acceptable tolerance.  The ATs are used to maintain attitude pointing while the 
wheel and system momentum is ‘dumped’.  At the completion of the maneuver, the system re-
verts back to the mode from which Delta-H entered, typically Observing mode. 
Spacecraft Safe Hold Control – SunSafe and SunSafe Gyroless 
A coarse sun-pointing mode (SunSafe) is responsible for initial attitude acquisition, and in the 
event of a perceived spacecraft anomaly, providing a sun-pointing, power and thermally safe, atti-
tude for an indefinite period of time.  SunSafe mode makes use of ten coarse sun sensors (CSS) to 
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determine a sun vector, and an IRU to determine the spacecraft angular velocity in the body 
frame.  Through use of reaction wheels, SunSafe mode provides full-sky reorientation to a sun-
pointing attitude along a ground supplied target sun vector in the body frame.  To reduce the mo-
mentum accumulation due to solar radiation torques, a rate bias is commanded, resulting in a 
spacecraft roll about the sun target vector. 
Nominally, SunSafe utilizes CSS and IRU data for feedback control, but in the event of an 
IRU failure, also includes a gyroless sub-mode.  SunSafe Gyroless exists to compute rate infor-
mation from the CSS data alone.  Since the IRU is no longer in the feedback loop, the spacecraft 
rate about the sun line cannot be determined.  Therefore, sun-pointing is maintained without con-
trol about the sunline.  Another difference in these safe hold modes is that during eclipse; Sun-
Safe Gyroless does not have attitude or rate feedback so the spacecraft is allowed to drift until sun 
presence returns (essentially open-loop control during eclipse). 
Adcole Coarse Sun Sensors 
The most basic sensors used on LRO to determine 
spacecraft attitude are ten Adcole coarse sun sensors.  
These small devices collect sunlight and convert the 
amount of sunlight into an electrical current.  That cur-
rent level is then translated into a digital signal, which 
is then processed by the onboard flight software.  The 
amount of sunlight produced by each CSS is a measure 
of the angle between the line to the sun and the bore 
sight of the CSS.  When combined with other CSS 
measurements, a three dimensional estimate of where 
the Sun is relative to the spacecraft body frame is 
computed. 
While relatively simple, these sensors are extreme-
ly important to the health and safety of the spacecraft.  These devices are very small, relatively 
inexpensive, yet their input is the key to providing an attitude input to SunSafe.  Without them 
working correctly, having the spacecraft thermally and electrically safe is questionable. 
SELEX Galileo Star Trackers 
Fine pointing attitude determination is accomplished by two SELEX Galileo Star Trackers.  
These STs have a 16° x 16° field of view and produce a quaternion attitude solution in the ST 
frame with respect the J2000 Earth Centered Inertial reference frame.  Each tracker produces an 
attitude solution at 10 Hz but for the LRO application is read and processed at the ACS cycle of 5 
Hz.  Both trackers receive a one pulse per second (PPS) timing synchronization input from the 
spacecraft’s onboard oscillators (clocks) and have their own 1553 Remote Terminal address for 
independent operation.   
Star tracker processing includes a derived rate option that filters a differentiated quaternion 
output from the tracker in the event that the IRU onboard the spacecraft becomes unavailable.  
These derived rate measurements serve as a backup rate during critical Delta-V operations and 
can allow the Observing mode to function, albeit with degraded performance, to continue science 
instrument data collection and calibration.  
Honeywell Miniature Inertial Measurement Unit  
Honeywell’s Miniature Inertial Measurement Unit (MIMU) serves as a single IRU.  It con-
tains 3 ring-laser gyros (one gyro per axis) that are used to produce spacecraft inertial body rates. 
Figure 3. Adcole CSS mounted on 
LRO Solar Array 
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This unit outputs an accumulated angle, which is sam-
pled by the onboard system at 10 Hz and differenced 
to produce the body rates.  These 10 Hz rate estimates 
are averaged over two samples to provide a rate for 
use in the feedback loop at the ACS cycle time of 5 
Hz.  Due to accumulated angle roll-over ambiguity, 
the MIMU gyros provide only direction of spin but 
not the magnitude of the attitude rate for rates above a 
saturation level.  For LRO the IRU saturation level is 
18 deg/sec.  The MIMU was turned on prior to launch 
and, has performed flawlessly in continuous operation 
during the LRO mission. 
NASA GSFC Demiseable Integrated Reaction Wheels 
Fine pointing control of the LRO spacecraft is 
accomplished through the use of four Reaction 
Wheels (RWs).  These actuators were developed, 
built, tested, and delivered in-house by the 
NASA Goddard GN&C Hardware Branch.  Each 
RW uses an 18-inch aluminum flywheel, provid-
ing inertia for momentum exchange.  The RWs 
are mounted in a pyramid configuration with a 
reaction wheel assembly system momentum sto-
rage capacity of 130 Nms.   
The LRO RW contains several design fea-
tures.  Each wheel has software and firmware for 
controlling either wheel speed or wheel torque as 
well as the reporting of telemetry.  Each wheel 
also has a separate 1553 Remote Terminal ad-
dress.  The internal software and firmware can be reprogrammed from the ground if desired dur-
ing the mission.  Although not used for this lunar mission, the wheel design has the added feature 
of nearly complete burn-up if it were to plummet into the Earth’s atmosphere at the end of its life.   
Propulsion Deployment Electronics 
The Propulsion Deployment Electronics 
(PDE) has a number of functions used to com-
plete the LRO mission.  First, the PDE com-
mands the firing of the thrusters when desired 
as well as firing of the Propulsion NASA Stan-
dard Initiators (NSI) for opening of the propul-
sion pressurization tank.  During the Solar Ar-
ray (SA) and High Gain Antenna (HGA) dep-
loyment, the PDE is used to turn on the Non 
Explosive Actuators (NEA).  Additionally, the 
PDE prevents the radio frequency transmitters 
from functioning until launch vehicle fairing 
separation, and provides extra switch capabili-
ties for science payload heaters.  This component was designed to allow the propulsion system to 
have redundant drive electronics to support the redundant set of thrusters.  The PDE is designed 
Figure 4. MIMU mounted on LRO 
Figure 5. Reaction Wheel Assembly 
mounted on LRO in a tetrahedron configura-
tion 
Figure 6. PDE 
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with four identical electronic boards and one module for the prevention of certain spacecraft func-
tions at the desired times. 
The design of the four PDE electronic boards allows for the critical Lunar Orbit Insertion 
(LOI) maneuvers to be completed, even if one of the four identical electronic boards is declared 
suspect.  Each of the four electronic boards has their own 1553 remote terminal address.  The 
thrusters are connected to electronic boards in a manner that allows LRO to complete its desired 
orbit adjustment despite a thruster failure. 
LRO MISSION TIMELINE 
The first twelve hours of the flight were packed with action (refer to Table 1).  Immediately 
after separation, SunSafe, the default control mode, autonomously removed the tip-off rates and 
placed the spacecraft in a power-positive orientation.  Afterwards, the deployables were extended 
to put the spacecraft in its flight configuration.  The GN&C hardware as well as other subsystems 
were powered on, and the ACS mode was transitioned to Observing mode.  Thruster one-shots 
were performed to ensure thrusters were working, and the communication was switched from 
omni-directional antenna to the HGA.   
One day after launch, LRO conducted a mid course correction maneuver to adjust the inclina-
tion of its orbit.  After the mid course correction, LRO cruised towards the moon with little ex-
citement for three days.  On the fifth day after launch, June 23, 2009 at 6:26:26am EDT, LRO 
completed a flawless LOI maneuver to place itself in an elliptical orbit about the Moon (Figure 7 
shows the various phases of LRO’s orbit during its mission: initial trajectory, LOI, commission-
ing orbit, and nominal orbit).  Over the next five days, four more LOI maneuvers transferred LRO 
into its commissioning orbit. 
Over the next ten weeks, the spacecraft and instrument teams commissioned their respective 
systems.  Commissioning was when the GN&C Team had a chance to test out its primary attitude 
control mode as well as calibrate all of its systems.  Once commissioning was completed, a series 
of thruster maneuvers, mission orbit insertion (MOI), lowered LRO into its nominal 50 km mean 
mission orbit where it began collecting meaningful science data.  
 
Figure 7. LRO Orbit Phases 
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LRO separated from the Atlas V launch vehicle with tip-off rates of approximately [-0.1, 0.2, -
0.8] deg/sec in the x,y, and z axes, respectively.  Figure 8 shows the autonomous acquisition of 
the Sun by the SunSafe control mode.  Shown are the spacecraft rates and spacecraft body sun 
vector.  During the separation, the spacecraft was in a sun-avoidance state, which seeks to keep 
the sun off of the spacecraft +Z-axis, to avoid instrument illumination.  SunSafe simultaneously 
removed the tip-off rates, as well as began maneuvering the spacecraft so the Sun is on the -Z-
axis.  Once sun-avoidance was exited, SunSafe began maneuvering the spacecraft to point the 
folded SA towards the Sun (SA on the –Y-axis).  The presented data shows that it took approx-
imately 8.5 minutes to acquire the Sun after separation.   
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Figure 8. Spacecraft Angular Velocity and Sun Vector during Sun Acquisition.  The Sun target is 
the –Y spacecraft axis – i.e. a target vector of [0,-1,0]. 
CRUISE  
This section details GN&C activities after sun acquisition until lunar orbit acquisition.  Fifty 
minutes after separation, the SA was deployed to increase power accumulation.  Twenty-five mi-
nutes later, the HGA boom was deployed to put the spacecraft into its deployed configuration.  
Five minutes after deployments were completed, the star trackers were turned on and the ACS 
control mode was switched from SunSafe to Observing for the first time.  Immediately after-
wards, the GN&C Team ran a thruster one-shot test, where each of the eight ATs and each of the 
four NTs were pulsed one time while the spacecraft was holding an inertial attitude.  These one-
shot tests demonstrated that thruster performance was within specified tolerance of all pre-
planned metrics.  
Solar Array and High Gain Antenna Deployment 
The Mechanical subsystem team requested that the GN&C team monitor the IRU rates in 
hopes that this data would help to verify proper deployment of the HGA and SA.  In particular, 
they were interested in assessing proper functioning of the deployment latch mechanisms. While 
it was not possible to absolutely verify proper functioning of the latch mechanisms using IRU 
data alone, it was thought that careful inspection of the rate data would provide some corroborat-
ing evidence of proper deployment.  Figure 9 presents the spacecraft angular velocity during the 
SA and HGA deployments.  The deployment process began with the firing of a non-explosive 
actuator, which released the SA from the spacecraft.  To allow the SA panels to unfold, the SA 
was mechanically driven to an extended position (identified as (90,-45) degrees).  During this 
time, the two panels began to unfold with the assistance of spring mechanisms.  The SA panels 
latched into place when they reached their deployed positions.  Afterwards, the SA was driven 
back to its ‘index’ position, identified as (90, 45) degrees.  A few minutes later, the HGA boom 
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was released from the spacecraft body and extended to its deployed configuration with the aid of 
a non-explosive actuator and a spring-loaded mechanism.  A latch engaged when the HGA boom 
arrived at its deployed position.    
 
Figure 9. Spacecraft Angular Velocity during Deployments 
During both deployments, a system momentum rate of change safing action point (AP) was 
tripped in the Fault Detection and Correction System (FDC).  The system momentum rate of 
change limit was set to 3.3 Nm and the action point trips if the limit is exceeded for more than 3 
seconds.  As can be seen in Figure 10, the limit is exceeded for more than 3 times on a few occa-
sions during the deployment sequence.  The original purpose of this safing action point was to 
detect and prevent system momentum from growing too fast to handle with wheels, and to pre-
vent fuel loss.  When this AP tripped, the FDC commanded the spacecraft to isolate the propul-
sion system, transition to SunSafe, and stop any activities occurring on the spacecraft.  In the dep-
loyment situation, there were no issues with the propulsion system because none of the isolation 




First Anomalous Entry into SunSafe 
The spacecraft’s first anomalous entry into SunSafe occurred soon after the thruster checkout 
and during the first transition into Observing mode.  The transition into SunSafe was caused by 
not having ephemerides loaded to the spacecraft.  During nominal operations, the spacecraft ge-
nerates the target attitude using an on-board ephemeris uploaded from the ground.  However, dur-
ing early operations, the spacecraft was using a ground uploaded target attitude and therefore 
ephemerides were not needed.  Unfortunately, the safing configuration did not check to see what 
the target source was and automatically transitioned the spacecraft back into SunSafe.  There was 
very little impact to the spacecraft operations due to this event, and no further action was re-
quired. 
Observing Mode Checkout 
Shortly after the thruster one-shot tests and spacecraft appendage deployment were successful-
ly completed, a series of attitude slews were performed using the Observing mode controller to 
provide an initial set of data for calibration of the IRU bias, alignment, and scale factor.  This 
“mini-cal” of the IRU was followed up later with a more precise IRU calibration involving a se-
ries of large angle slews over several hours.  At this time, a relative ST calibration was also per-
formed using ST quaternion data to compute corrections to ST alignments, removing any resi-
duals between the ST quaternion outputs.  This corrected a known error in the ST alignment, 
loaded at launch, which was on the order of a few tenths of a degree.  Calibration parameters 
were uploaded to the spacecraft, and the onboard attitude Kalman Filter (KF) was initialized for 
the first time using measured data from both STs.  During the cruise phase, both STs were operat-
ing with nominal performance and the KF remained converged with a steady-state attitude esti-
mation error covariance of approximately 2 to 3 arc-sec (1 sigma).  Since fine pointing perfor-
mance was not needed during the cruise phase, the KF output was not used for attitude feedback 
or for IRU bias correction.  Instead, a ST was selected as the attitude source and a constant bias 
correction was applied to the IRU rates used for feedback control.  This provided the team with 
Figure 10.  Spacecraft System Angular Momentum Rate of Change during Deployments 
 
 11
the opportunity to trend the KF performance during the transit to the moon before utilizing KF 
output in the feedback, as required for fine pointing performance during the rest of the mission.  
Figure 11 shows a plot of typical attitude errors during cruise, when the attitude feedback was set 
to the ST output.  Note the boresight of this ST is aligned within about 30 deg from the spacecraft 
Z-axis and perpendicular to the X-axis of the spacecraft.  Thus, the larger ST errors about the bo-
resight result in relatively larger attitude errors about the Z and Y axes.  
Occasionally, the attitude source was set to IRU propagation.  This was primarily done in 
preparation for Delta-V operations and during ST occultations, which occurred when the space-
craft maintained inertial attitude during initial lunar orbit operations.  This gave the team a chance 
to observe the best controller performance that could be achieved when targeting inertial attitudes 
with minimal disturbances present.  Figure 12 shows typical 1 arc-sec level attitude error perfor-
mance attained using IRU propagation as attitude feedback, when the SA was fixed, no spacecraft 
instruments were moving, and the reaction wheels were at low momentum levels.  The data from 
Figure 12 was captured on Day of Year (DOY) 174.  Attitude error when the IRU propagation 
was used as the attitude source, during inertial attitude targeting, demonstrated the best controller 




Figure 11. Typical Attitude Error when ST selected for Attitude Feedback during Cruise 
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Figure 12. Best Attitude Performance Using IRU Propagation During Cruise Phase (DOY 174) 
LUNAR ORBIT ACQUISITION 
The LRO spacecraft performed a series of seven thruster maneuvers to reach the spacecraft’s 
commissioning orbit with the first and third maneuvers being critical and the third maneuver the 
most critical.  This section discusses the first maneuver, Mid Course Correction 1, and the third 
maneuver, Lunar Orbit Insertion 1.   
Mid Course Correction 1 
Mid Course Correction 1 (MCC-1) was performed on June 19, 2009, approximately 24 hours 
after launch and lasted about 48 seconds.  MCC-1 used 4 out of the 12 thrusters on-board the 
spacecraft in an off-pulsing configuration.  The maneuver executed flawlessly and phase plane 
plots of the maneuver are shown in Figure 13.  The horizontal axis of each subplot represents the 
attitude error and the vertical axis of each plot represents the rate error seen by the Delta-V con-
troller.  The maximum absolute attitude error was 0.57 deg and the maximum absolute rate error 
was 0.13 deg/sec. 
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Figure 13. Mid Course Correction Maneuver Phase Plane Attitude and Rate Error 
Lunar Orbit Insertion 1 
The third Delta-V maneuver performed by the spacecraft was Lunar Orbit Insertion 1 (LOI-1).  
LOI-1 was the longest thruster maneuver executed by the spacecraft, 40 minutes, and used all 12 
of the thrusters on the spacecraft.  The 4 NTs were full on, and the 8 ATs were controlled in an 
On-Pulsed Mode.  LOI-1 was used to slow down the spacecraft in order to be captured by the 
Moon’s gravitational field.  Any issues with this critical maneuver could have resulted in a de-
graded science mission or loss of mission.  This maneuver executed flawlessly with small attitude 
and rates errors as shown by the phase plane plots in Figure 14.  The maximum absolute attitude 
error was 3.2 deg and the maximum absolute rate error was 0.36 deg/sec. 
  
Figure 14. Lunar Orbit Insertion Maneuver Phase Plane 
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A time history of the attitude error during the LOI-1 maneuver is shown in Figure 15.  As 
shown in the figure, an initial transient was seen in the controller and these errors were damped 
out within a couple of minutes in the x and y axes and within 10 minutes in the z axis. 
 
Figure 15. Lunar Orbit Insertion Maneuver Time-History Attitude Error 
Second Anomalous Entry into SunSafe 
Another unexpected entry into SunSafe mode occurred during the first lunar orbit after LOI-1.  
Both STs were occulted by the Moon for a duration of 1 hour.  This was expected since the LRO 
had not yet started Nadir targeting operations and the onboard target was inertial.  Both STs en-
tered standby mode when the ST data was marked as invalid during the lunar occultation.  The 
attitude source was set to ST1 at this time, so the onboard attitude was IRU propagated from the 
last valid ST1 quaternion (just prior to Moon occultation).  The FDC system includes monitors 
for each ST operational mode.  If either ST’s operational mode is “standby”, then it is com-
manded back into the autonomous attitude determination (AAD) mode at 1 minute intervals, 
causing the ST to attempt to re-acquire the attitude from a “lost in space” condition.  During one 
of these attempts to promote ST1 from standby mode to AAD mode during the occultation, ST1 
computed a “valid” quaternion, with also a “valid” rate, for a single ACS cycle.  This “valid” qua-
ternion had a very large error in excess of 100 deg.  But, since it was marked as valid, it was 
processed by the onboard system for use.  An additional delta quaternion check, which compares 
the ST quaternion to a valid one from the previous cycle, failed to catch the error since the pre-
vious cycle was marked as invalid.  As a result, this single piece of inaccurate attitude data was 
used as the attitude source for one ACS cycle.   After this cycle, the ST data immediately became 
invalid again, and the ST dropped back into standby mode.  So, the onboard attitude was again 
the IRU propagated attitude, but unfortunately propagated from this erroneous ST quaternion 
(which had been marked as “valid”).  Thus, the onboard attitude solution remained inaccurate, 
thereafter and the onboard FDC sent LRO into SunSafe due to the persistent large attitude error. 
LOI 2 through LOI 5 
The remaining LOI maneuvers were accomplished using the same two NTs and all eight of the 
ATs.  With each successive maneuver, the GN&C Team estimated a new feed forward torque to 
apply to the controller in order to reduce the initial attitude transient.  Table 2 shows the maxi-
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mum attitude error and rate error the spacecraft saw during each maneuver.  Notice that the max-
imum attitude error decreased with each successive maneuver. 
Table 2.  LOI-2 to LOI-5 Performance 
 Max Abs Attitude Error (deg) Max Abs Rate Error (deg/sec) 
Maneuver X Y Z X Y Z 
LOI-2 0.65 1.46 1.16 0.11 0.12 0.28 
LOI-3 0.06 0.92 0.27 0.02 0.20 0.07 
LOI-4 0.07 0.83 0.20 0.02 0.21 0.07 
LOI-5 0.06 0.78 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.08 
COMMISSIONING 
During the Commissioning phase of the mission, LRO engineers and scientists checked-out 
and calibrated their respective systems.  The operations team planned and executed a number of 
off-point maneuvers to accommodate the science and engineering teams.  During this time, the 
SA unexpectedly hit a gimbal lock situation.  Also, the Observing mode control mode was tested 
in great detail and disturbances causing attitude transients were studied and understood. 
Solar Array Gimbal Lock Event 
The SA encountered a gimbal lock situation on July 1, 2009 when the sun target vector ap-
proached [0,-1,0], i.e., when the sun is directly on the –Y-axis of the spacecraft based on up-
loaded ephemeris.  This happens because there are an infinite number of possible solutions for 
that particular array orientation.  Observed performance showed the commanded SA Gimbal 1 
angle swerve, stop, turn around, and continued to swerve for an orbit; refer to Figure 16.  Since 
the spacecraft was flying with a 30 degree offset (for thermal reasons), the SA really was not at 
the gimbal lock orientation.  But, the SA targeting algorithm uses a target sun vector (computed 
from on-board ephemeris) instead of the measured sun vector.  Therefore, when the target sun 
vector became [0,-1,0], the algorithm detected gimbal lock.  However, the observed flight beha-
vior was not seen during testing, which led to a deeper study of the event.   
The SA targeting algorithm determines gimbal lock by comparing the target vector to a toler-
ance value.  When that tolerance value is set properly, gimbal lock is identified early and the SA 
is sent to a pre-defined angle of + 90 deg for gimbal 1.  Flight results show that gimbal lock was 
not detected early.  Gimbal 1 was commanded to +90 deg, but then exited gimbal lock and pro-
ceeded to follow a swerving command.  This means that the tolerance value was not set properly 
(it’s a table value – current value is 1x10^-16 rad and it should be 1x10^-10 rad).  Figure 16 shows 
the expected behavior with the correct tolerance setting, “HiFi Predicted Ang”. 
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Figure 16. Array Gimbal Lock Event plotted against High Fidelity Simulation Results 
The easiest solution to prevent the observed performance when gimbal lock is encountered 
again is to change the tolerance value to 1x10^-10 rad.  But this requires the creation, testing and 
uploading of a new table.  Gimbal lock only occurs when the spacecraft is at a high solar beta 
angle, and since the nominal operational plan is to park the SA at high solar beta angles, this situ-
ation should never occur again.  The reason it was encountered is because the nominal SA opera-
tional plan was not being followed.   
Observing Mode Performance 
LRO demonstrated excellent pointing performance during Observing mode nadir and inertial 
attitude target operations during the entire Commissioning phase.  LRO pointing requirements are 
given as pointing accuracy and knowledge relative to the prime ST reference frame.  Since there 
is no direct measure of pointing accuracy relative to this frame, the derived attitude control error 
requirement of 15 arc-sec (3 sigma), consistent with the LRO knowledge and attitude accuracy 
requirements, was used to access pointing performance.  
Transient LRO attitude errors observed during commissioning, shown in Figure 17 and Figure 
18, resulted primarily from three sources: Diviner instrument calibrations, RW zero crossings, 
and SA articulation.  A description of each of these disturbances is documented in the subsections 
below.   
An additional error source seen in Figure 17, which will not be described in detail, was due to 
a non-constant nadir target rate resulting from the low-lunar-elliptic commissioning orbit.  A 
small amplitude pitch error variation at the orbit period of 2 hours exists.  This sinusoidal varia-
tion of attitude error of about +/- 2 arc-sec, was eliminated after LRO was maneuvered into the 
nearly circular mission orbit.   
Even during times of considerable disturbance, primarily due to RW zero crossings and SA ar-
ticulation as shown in Figure 18, the attitude errors were maintained below the statistical attitude 
error requirement level of 15 arc-sec (3 sigma) as documented in Table 3. 
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Figure 17.  Attitude Error during DOY 189, 00:00 GMT 
Diviner Instrument Calibration Disturbance.  Figure 17 shows attitude error for a typical orbit 
during nadir target operations on DOY 189 during times when the SA is not moving and RWs do 
not cross zero speed.  Attitude errors remain below 2 arc-sec, with the exception of transients 
caused by Diviner instrument motion.  There are two types of Diviner motion that caused space-
craft pointing error.  The smaller disturbance was caused by a “barrel roll” or elevation-only gim-
bal motion for pointing the instrument to deep space for calibration.  These occurred at 10 minute 
intervals and resulted in less than 5 arc-sec pointing error, primarily about the spacecraft roll axis.  
The other Diviner disturbance is a result of two axis motion of the Diviner azimuth and elevation 
gimbals occurring once per orbit.  The effective inertia load of the azimuth gimbal is much larger 
than that of the elevation gimbal.  Thus, the corresponding spacecraft attitude disturbance, pri-
marily about the spacecraft yaw axis, is larger respectively, as shown in Figure 17 at approx-
imately 67 minutes.  The Diviner azimuth disturbance is clearly present at time = 470 minutes 
and has an amplitude of approximately 23 arc-sec, refer to Figure 18. 
Reaction Wheel Zero Crossing Disturbance.  Data taken during DOY 220 (Figure 18) shows 
somewhat increased pointing errors during the times when the SA is tracking the Sun and the 
RWs are crossing zero speeds.  The disturbances at time = 430, 442, 464, 470, 493, 497 minutes, 
and during period from time = 520 to 530 minutes are all caused by reaction wheel zero cross-
ings.  Worst case transients from wheel #3 cause pointing error transients of ~50 arc-sec as shown 
in Figure 18 at time=465 min.  Wheel speed zero crossings continued to occur each orbit as X-Z 
momentum increased at higher rates than pitch axis momentum.  During subsequent Delta-H 
wheel momentum unloading, pitch momentum biasing was used to minimize low speed wheel 
operation while maintaining system momentum within 80 Nms over a required two week period.  
Although using this strategy, it was not always possible to entirely avoid zero crossings within the 
system momentum constraints. 
Solar Array Elevation Gimbal Step Disturbance. On DOY 220 attitude transients apparent at 
time = 427, 437, 480, and 500 min were due to SA elevation angle command step transients, Fig-
ure 18.  Generally, the SA elevation gimbal is stopped or moving somewhat slowly during nadir 
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target operations.  Integrator wind-up in the SA gimbal controller resulted in instantaneous SA 
motion of about two cardinal steps (0.015 deg).  These disturbances resulted in rate transients of 
about 30-40 arc-sec/sec about roll axis and 20-30 arc-sec/sec about yaw axis, as shown in Figure 
19.  These rates were somewhat large, but still within the LRO stability requirements.  Options 
for elimination of this disturbance are to zero out the integrator gain or to reduce the integral lim-
its in the SA elevation controller, neither of which was implemented during the commissioning 
phase.  
 
Figure 18.  Attitude Error during DOY 220, GMT 07:00 
Solar Array Harmonic Drive Gear Transmission Error Disturbance. Figure 18 also shows 
typical attitude error response due to SA harmonic drive gear transmission error, primarily about 
the pitch axis.  This error is caused by a sustained SA oscillation driven at harmonics of the SA 
gimbal drive speed.  The dominant disturbance occurred at a 2x harmonic of the SA rate, with a 
period of approximately 15 to 20 sec due to the rather high 200:1 gear ratio of the drive system.  
This effect resulted in a maximum attitude error of ~11 arc-sec over a typical orbit, shown in Fig-
ure 18 on DOY 220.  This maximum error coincides with the SA rewind when the SA azimuth 
gimbal reverses direction at time = 470 min.  While this error was predicted prior to flight, it was 
somewhat surprising that the magnitude of the error seemed to be dependent on the direction of 
gimbal rotation and perhaps the loading of the gears during the reversal.  Note that the error de-
creases as the SA continues to rewind after time = 480 min.  This gear transmission error has 
been trending somewhat lower as the solar beta angle decreases, as a result of the decreased iner-
tia loading about the +Y gimbal axis. 
Solar Array Rewind Disturbance.  Since LRO is Nadir pointing in a polar orbit, the SA +Y 
gimbal reverses direction twice an orbit over the lunar poles.  The attitude disturbance resulting 
from this SA “rewind” is minimized by using acceleration profiling.  As the SA approaches the 
rewind condition, the gimbal rate is slowly reduced to zero over a period of about two minutes.  
After a few minutes in a stopped condition the SA rotation is reversed and the rate is slowly in-
creased, again over a two minute period.  The effect of this rewind disturbance can be seen in the 
body rate plot for DOY 220, Figure 19, at time = 465 and 525 min.  As shown in Figure 19, max-
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imum rates from this disturbance were about 20 arc-sec/sec.  These rate spikes occur at the end of 
deceleration and beginning of acceleration from a stopped condition due to the drive having a 
non-zero minimum rate.  Figure 18 shows that the attitude transients due to SA rewind was typi-
cally less than 10 arc-sec. 
 
Figure 19.  Rate Error during DOY 220, GMT 07:00 
 
Table 3.  Observing Mode Controller Error Statistics 
 
Roll 
(arc-sec, 3 sigma) 
Pitch 
(arc-sec, 3 sigma) 
Yaw 
(arc-sec, 3 sigma) 
Nadir with SA fixed and no RW 
zero crossings (DOY 189) 2.2 5.3 2.8 
Nadir with SA tracking and RW 
zero crossings (DOY 220) 13.8 10.9 7.1 
Requirement 15.0 15.0 15.0 
CONCLUSION 
This paper detailed experiences from the Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) Team 
during launch through commissioning of the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO).  An overview 
of the GN&C subsystem was followed with a brief discussion of the mission timeline.  An early 
mission chronological narrative described the GN&C subsystem performance and interesting 
GN&C events.  Spacecraft angular velocity data showed that the initial attitude acquisition, fol-
lowing launch vehicle separation, was successful.  Flight telemetry received both in real time and 
stored for later downlink demonstrated excellent GN&C system performance.  With the exception 
of a few anomalous entries into SunSafe mode, the system operation was flawless.  These safe 
hold transitions, while unplanned, provided the team a unique opportunity to demonstrate the re-
liability of SunSafe mode and recovery operations.    
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Assisting in the early LRO mission and spacecraft commissioning provided the GN&C team 
invaluable experience operating a spacecraft being inserted into Lunar orbit.  We are all very 
proud and grateful to have had the privilege to participate in this historic NASA return to the 
Moon.  Currently, LRO is conducting its nominal science mission collecting much needed data 
for NASA’s eventual return to the Lunar surface. 
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